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Abstract
Is it always wise to disclose good news? We ﬁnd that the worst sender
with good news has the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news
can paradoxically make the sender look bad. If the good news is attainable
by suﬃciently mediocre types, or if the sender is already expected to be of a
relatively high type, withholding good news is an equilibrium so the standard
“unraveling” argument does not hold. Since the sender has a legitimate fear
of looking too anxious to reveal good news, having a third party disclose the
news, or mandating that the sender disclose the news, can help the sender.
The predictions are tested by examining when economics faculty at diﬀerent
institutions use titles such as “Dr” and “Professor” in voicemail greetings and
course syllabi.
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1 Introduction
If you have good news should you disclose it? According to the standard “unrav-
eling” result, not only is it wise to disclose good news, but given that good news
is disclosed it is also necessary to disclose mediocre or even bad news to avoid be-
ing perceived as having even worse news (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1980;
Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et al.,
1990). This result on the power of voluntary disclosure has informed long-running
debates over whether to mandate disclosure in such areas as ﬁnancial statements,
nutrition information, health warnings, and environmental impact.
Despite this result, people are often unsure whether to reveal good news, and
nondisclosure is frequently observed in practice. For instance, advertisers of high
quality products frequently use a “soft sell” approach, talented students are often
reluctant to brag about their grades, highly educated people do not always list their
degrees, donors sometimes make anonymous donations, overachievers often engage
in understatement, and people accused of an oﬀense sometimes withhold mitigating
information rather than “protest too much” or “make excuses.”
Most of the literature explains such anomalies by examining why the absence
of good news is not always treated skeptically. Answers include that messages are
costly (Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1983; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986), there are strate-
gic reasons for withholding information (Dye, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990;
Board, 2008; Levin et al., 2005), sender preferences are not monotonic (Giovannoni
and Seidmann, 2007; Seidmann and Winter, 1997), there is uncertainy over whether
the sender has a veriﬁable message (Dye, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et al.,
1990; Shin, 1994, 2003), or the receiver is na¨ ıve (Dye, 1998), uninformed (Fishman
and Hagerty, 2003), or boundedly attentive (Hirshleifer et al., 2002).
While these approaches explain many cases of nondisclosure, they do not capture
the idea that boasting about good news might itself be treated skeptically. To
see how revealing good news can paradoxically make one look bad, we consider
situations where the sender can reveal good news that is unambiguously favorable
and perhaps even the best available, but still not impressive. When good news is
relatively common, is boasting about it still a good idea? Or is boasting treated
with such skepticism that modesty is the best policy?
Consider whether a restaurant should disclose its health department ratings.
Starting in 1998, Los Angeles health oﬃcials began requiring restaurants to post
large hygiene grades at their entrances, with a high proportion of grades being an A
1(see Jin and Leslie, 2003). The unraveling result implies that all restaurants should
post their grades voluntarily, so why was it necessary to require even A restaurants to
disclose their hygiene grade? Or consider whether a person with a doctorate should
use a title such as “Dr” or “PhD.” In environments where PhDs are common, can
use of a title be seen not just as redundant, but as a signal that the person has good
reason to fear appearing unqualiﬁed?
To understand how boasting can be treated skeptically, we relax the assumptions
of the standard disclosure model in two ways. First, rather than assuming that the
sender can fully reveal her quality with a veriﬁable message, we assume that there
are a limited number of veriﬁable messages that can only reveal a range within
which the sender’s quality falls. This coarseness of the message space is natural for
many applications where there is a ﬁxed set of messages that have some institutional
mechanism for veriﬁcation. For instance, a restaurant cannot reveal its exact quality,
but can reveal its hygiene grade.
Second, we allow the receiver to evaluate the sender based in part on his own
private information about the sender, e.g., a diner has his own impression of a
restaurant’s quality. If there is any such information, no matter how weak, the
receiver will have a more favorable impression of higher quality senders even without
disclosure, so higher quality senders have less incentive to disclose.1 Therefore such
information eliminates the knife-edge case where each sender with the same veriﬁable
message has the same incentive to disclose, and permits the application of standard
equilibrium reﬁnements to disclosure games. These reﬁnements justify the idea that
the receiver will respond skeptically to unexpected disclosure, which is the key to
our nondisclosure results.
In this framework we reexamine the classic question of when good news is re-
vealed, and when the pressure to avoid looking bad leads to an unraveling equilib-
rium in which all information is revealed. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) ﬁnd that
unraveling is the unique equilibrium if there is a separate veriﬁable message avail-
able to each type.2 We extend this suﬃciency condition to show that unraveling is
the unique equilibrium if the message space is suﬃciently ﬁne, or if the available
messages represent suﬃciently good news. And we show that the latter condition
is necessary to ensure unraveling in that a nondisclosure equilibrium always exists
if veriﬁable messages are attainable by suﬃciently mediocre types. Because of the
private receiver information, this nondisclosure equilibrium cannot be reﬁned away
by standard reﬁnements.
Applied to the example of restaurant hygiene cards, a high proportion of restau-
rants receive an A, so the message space is coarse and the best message is attainable
1In a market competition context, Daughety and Reinganum (2007) allow for a signaling game to
coexist with a disclosure game. Here we assume that the receiver’s extra information is exogenous.
2More precisely, they assume that for each type there is a veriﬁable message for which that type
is the lowest type which can send the message.
2by relatively mediocre types. Moreover, diners are likely to have their own opinions
based on experience or word of mouth, so there is private information that helps
good restaurants do well even without disclosure. In this case it is the worst restau-
rants within the A category who have the strongest incentive to prove that they
meet basic hygiene standards. Given this incentive, disclosure of even an A grade
can be interpreted by diners as a bad sign that the restaurant feels it necessary to
counteract diner expectations. Therefore unraveling in our model can fail at the
very ﬁrst step—even the types with the best available news might not reveal it.
When a nondisclosure equilibrium exists the unraveling equilibrium also exists,
so there are often multiple equilibria which we show cannot be reﬁned away using
standard reﬁnements. This multiplicity of equilibria can capture the strategic un-
certainty that people often feel about whether or not it is appropriate to boast in a
particular situation. It also allows the model to capture the possibility that certain
equilibria are focal for traditional or cultural reasons. For example, professionals in
Germany traditionally use full titles, such as “Herr Professor Doktor,” while pro-
fessionals in England are traditionally more understated, including medical doctors
who switch from “Dr” to “Mr” upon becoming a member of the Royal College of
Surgeons.
The model oﬀers new insight into several policy issues that have been exten-
sively debated from diﬀerent perspectives. First is the long-standing question of
when disclosure should be mandatory. The existence of nondisclosure equilibria
implies that mandatory disclosure, or having a third party disclose the news, can
reduce communication problems due to nondisclosure and due to confusion over mul-
tiple equilibria. Such disclosure allows the sender to enjoy the beneﬁts of favorable
information without looking overly anxious to disclose it.3
A second policy issue is how diﬃcult it should be to meet diﬀerent standards
such as those for school diplomas or other certiﬁcates of quality. The literature
on standard setting typically trades oﬀ the gains from forcing higher quality among
those who meet the standard against the losses of lower rates of attainment (Costrell,
1994). Our model suggests higher standards have the additional advantage of being
less likely to induce a nondisclosure equilibrium. For instance, a tougher grading
system might induce more rather than fewer students to try to make good grades.
Finally, the model oﬀers new insight into the question of how ﬁne or coarse
standards should be, e.g., whether to use numerical or letter grades. In many
contexts it is common to use letter grades rather than numerical grades, or even to
use pass/fail criteria such as just providing a diploma or not. Since unraveling is the
3Consequently mandatory or third-party disclosure can also have positive incentive eﬀects. For
instance, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that restaurant hygiene, as measured by inspectors and also
as reﬂected in the incidence of food-related illnesses, improved after restaurants were forced to post
their grades. Similarly, if students are reluctant to brag about their grades, then directly posting
their grades ensures that the information is released, thereby increasing study incentives.
3unique equilibrium if the message space is suﬃciently ﬁne and accurately measures
quality, letter grades or pass/fail criteria reduce information not just directly by
coarsening the message space, but indirectly as well by encouraging nondisclosure.
This result on the ﬁneness of veriﬁable messages also has implications for how
prior information about the sender aﬀects the incentive to disclose. If the receiver
already has a relatively accurate estimate of the sender’s quality based on a public
signal, then the message space conditional on this information is eﬀectively less
ﬁne in that it provides less additional information. If the public signal is accurate
enough we ﬁnd that non-disclosure is an equilibrium, so this supports the intuition
that boasting is most likely when there is little public information about the sender.
This complements a similar argument made by Veblen (1899) in the context of a
signaling environment where boasting is costly.
The model predicts that the frequency of nondisclosure should be negatively
correlated with the rarity of the good news. For instance, in the restaurant example
if it became more diﬃcult to receive an A then we would expect more disclosure.
Even if the standard for good news does not change, the model implies that the
frequency of disclosure should be negatively correlated with any public signal that
is positively correlated with sender type. That is, if the distribution of sender types
is known to be weighted toward higher (lower) types, then good news is relatively
less (more) impressive, so disclosure is less (more) likely.
Our assumption that the sender’s quality is not fully veriﬁable is distinct from
the assumption in some models that there is uncertainty over whether the sender has
a veriﬁable message (Dye 1985; Farrell 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et al. 1990, example
3; Shin 1994, 2003). Such uncertainty can also reduce the incentive to disclose. For
instance, if restaurants are not always given a hygiene grade to report, diners will be
less critical of restaurants that do not disclose a grade, so restaurants with mediocre
grades might ﬁnd it worthwhile to pretend that they did not receive a grade. These
models assume that each level of sender quality is potentially veriﬁable, i.e., they
do not consider coarseness in the message space for quality, so in contrast with
our results they ﬁnd that a sender always wants to show oﬀ when his quality is
suﬃciently high.
The idea that an eagerness to show oﬀ can reﬂect unfavorably on the sender
was ﬁrst formalized by Teoh and Hwang (1991) who analyzed a two-period game in
which a ﬁrm decides whether or not to immediately disclose news that will eventually
be made public anyway. They show that holding back on good news hurts a ﬁrm
temporarily, but eventually separates a high quality ﬁrm from a low quality ﬁrm that
is less likely to have additional good news in the future.4 In contrast, we consider
4In addition to the assumption that the sender’s news is eventually revealed independently of the
sender’s disclosure decision, Teoh and Hwang’s two-period game has two additional assumptions
that reﬂect the institutional environment they consider. First, the sender receives a payoﬀ both
4a standard disclosure game in which there is only one period and the receiver does
not learn of news that is withheld.5
Our approach is related to that of Feltovich et al. (2002) who analyze how private
receiver information aﬀects signaling games. The main diﬀerence is that we are
interested in disclosure games with a restricted space of free and truthful messages
and conditions under which the standard unraveling result does and does not hold.
Feltovich et al. (2002) focus instead on signaling games with an unrestricted space of
increasingly costly messages. They ﬁnd that senders who are of high quality based
on their own private information might “countersignal,” i.e., pool with low quality
types, in order to show their conﬁdence. We ﬁnd that a similar pattern can arise in
our model, but most importantly we ﬁnd that senders who are already expected to be
of high quality based on public information tend to withhold good news. Therefore
our model captures the simple intuition that those who are recognized as high quality
are less likely to engage in self-promotion, even when it is entirely costless. Because
the predictions are based on public rather than private information, the model is
readily subject to empirical testing using ﬁeld data.6
In addition to Teoh and Hwang (1991) and Feltovich et al. (2002), the question
of understatement in sender-receiver games is investigated in several other papers.
O’Neill (2003) shows how countersignaling can arise when multiple receivers have
diﬀerent information. Baliga and Sjostrom (2001) show that an already successful
type might engage in false modesty regarding a new endeavor when success is likely
but not assured. Other models consider why signals might not be monotonically in-
creasing in type when the costs and beneﬁts of signals are viewed more generally, e.g.,
there are opportunity costs of signaling (Orzach and Tauman, 2005; Spence, 2001;
Sadowski, 2005), social costs to not conforming (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001), or
additional non-monotonic beneﬁts from signaling (Hvide, 2003). Understatement
in one dimension can also arise when there are multi-dimensional signals, e.g., the
combination of high prices and modest advertising can signal high quality (Orzach
et al., 2002; Bagwell and Overgaard, 2005), and the combination of high prices and
low observable quality can signal high unobservable quality (Clements, 2006). Good
news in one dimension might also be withheld when it attracts attention to bad
immediately after the choice to disclose and later after the original news and any additional news
is revealed. The equilibrium depends on the rate at which the second payoﬀ is discounted. Second,
the sender’s news has a direct eﬀect on sender payoﬀs beyond the usual indirect eﬀect via receiver
estimates of the sender’s type.
5Note that allowing the receiver to learn the news from another source with some probability
that is increasing in sender type would be another way to represent private receiver information in
our model.
6In a signaling model the magnitude of the equilibrium signal is normally increasing in the
sender’s type which is the sender’s private information. Since sender type is not known by the
receiver it is typically not known by the econometrician, so empirical tests often use indirect methods
to evaluate the theory (Bedard, 2001). Feltovich et al. (2002) test their model in an experimental
setting where the experimenter can control the subjects’ private information. Here we predict that
understatement is more likely based on public signals of the sender’s type.
5news in other dimensions (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004). And understatement can re-
sult when a one-dimensional signal is the only way to convey information on multiple
attributes (Araujo et al., 2007). In particular, if people vary in their concern both
for being good and for being perceived as good, they might conceal good deeds to
avoid the appearance of caring too much about appearances (Benabou and Tirole,
2006).7
We test the model by looking at when faculty use the title of “PhD,” “Dr”
or “Professor” and when they forgo such a title. In particular we look at the use
of these titles in voicemail greetings and course syllabi by PhD-holding full-time
faculty in the 26 economics departments in the University of California system and
California State University system. We predict that the use of titles will be less com-
mon in the eight departments with doctoral programs than in the 18 departments
without doctoral programs for two reasons. First, faculty in the departments with
doctoral programs have less need to distinguish themselves from non-PhD faculty
and lecturers since these groups are much less common in their universities. Second,
faculty in these departments are likely to interact more frequently with other fac-
ulty who already expect that they hold a PhD. Consistent with predictions, in all
of the tests (parametric, non-parametric, and regression-based) we ﬁnd that faculty
in departments with doctoral programs are signiﬁcantly less likely to use a title in
voicemail greetings and syllabi than faculty in departments without doctoral pro-
grams. In fact, consistent with the idea that advertising only mildly positive good
news is viewed negatively, faculty appear to deliberately avoid titles, e.g., stating
“You have reached the oﬃce of X” instead of “This is Professor X” in voicemail
greetings, or substituting “Instructor” for “Professor” in course syllabi.
In the following section we provide a simple model following the PhD example
introduced above. In Section 3 we develop a model with multiple levels of good
news that allows us to address more aspects of the problem. In Section 4 we provide
an empirical test of the model based on how titles are used by academic economists
and in Section 5 we conclude the paper.
2 An example
To see how coarse messages and private receiver information can lead to a nondis-
closure equilibrium, consider an example of an instructor (the sender) and a student
(the receiver). For simplicity assume that instructor quality q is distributed uni-
formly on [0,1] and that the instructor’s payoﬀ is just her expected quality. Assume
that instructors with quality above some standard q∗ have a PhD while others do
7Dynamic principal-agent models where high types try to pool with low types to avoid harder
assignments, e.g., ratchet eﬀect models (Freixas et al., 1985), also capture an incentive to be un-
derstated. Avoiding jealousy is of course another factor.
6not. Instructors cannot directly reveal their quality q, but they can choose to reveal
the less informative signal that they have a PhD if in fact they have one.
First suppose the student does not have any private information. If the student
expects the instructor to reveal her PhD if she has one, then an instructor’s payoﬀ
is E[q | q ≥ q∗] = (1 + q∗)/2 from disclosure but only E[q | q < q∗] = q∗/2 from
nondisclosure. So clearly an instructor with a PhD is better oﬀ revealing it and
disclosure is an equilibrium. What if the student does not expect disclosure? Then
the instructor’s payoﬀ is E[q] = 1
2 from nondisclosure and the payoﬀ from disclosure
depends on what the student believes if the instructor unexpectedly discloses. In
this disclosure game with costless messages all types of instructors q ≥ q∗ have
exactly the same incentive to deviate so, as discussed in Banks and Sobel (1987),
standard forward-induction reﬁnements developed for signaling games do not apply.
Clearly in this case the student has no reason to change her prior belief that the
instructor’s quality is distributed uniformly on [q∗,1].8 Therefore the instructor’s
payoﬀ from disclosure is, as before, E[q | q ≥ q∗] = (1 + q∗)/2 which is greater than
E[q] = 1/2 so all instructors will deviate and non-disclosure is not supportable by
reasonable beliefs.
Now suppose the student has some private information about the instructor, e.g.,
makes a judgement about the professor based on perceived similarities with other
instructors, or forms an impression of the instructor’s ability over the course of the
semester. If the information is even slightly informative about the instructor, then
better instructors will be evaluated more favorably even without disclosing their
PhD. The knife-edge nature of the game is thereby broken and diﬀerent types have
diﬀerent incentives to disclose, so it is possible to apply standard forward-induction
reﬁnements developed for signaling games. However, the presence of private receiver
information and the absence of signaling costs reverses the incentives to deviate
compared to a standard signaling game.9 Since better types expect to be evaluated
more favorably in the nondisclosure equilibrium, it is the worst types that have
the strongest incentive to disclose, so these reﬁnements mandate that unexpected
disclosure be viewed skeptically. If the standard q∗ for a PhD is suﬃciently low such
skepticism supports non-disclosure as an equilibrium.
To see this more exactly, suppose that the student has a binary private signal L
or H where Pr[H | q] = q so the chance of an H signal is higher for better instructors.
Clearly this information does not aﬀect the existence of the disclosure equilibrium in
which types q ≥ q∗ reveal their good news. Regarding a nondisclosure equilibrium,
if the student has an H signal the instructor’s expected quality is E[q | H] = 2/3,
8Such beliefs are often referred to as “passive beliefs” or “passive conjectures” (Rasmusen, 1994)
and in the cheap talk literature they form the basis for neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993).
9Reﬁnements like D1 eliminate pooling equilibria in standard signaling games because better
types have lower signaling costs so they are willing to deviate to a higher signal for a larger range
of payoﬀs.
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Figure 1: Expected payoﬀs as a function of q for diﬀerent equilibria
and if the student has an L signal the instructor’s expected quality is similarly
E[q | L] = 1/3. Therefore, an instructor of type q has an expected payoﬀ from
nondisclosure of qE[q | H] + (1 − q)E[q | L] = q 2
3 + (1 − q)1
3, which is increasing in
q. For instance, if q∗ = 1
3 then the worst type with a PhD (q = q∗) receives a payoﬀ
from nondisclosure of 1
3
2
3 + (1− 1
3)1
3 = 4/9, while the best type with a PhD (q = 1)
receives a payoﬀ from nondisclosure of 12
3+(1−1)1
3 = 2/3. Since the worst instructor
with good news receives the lowest payoﬀ from nondisclosure, the worst instructor
will deviate and disclose for a wider range of belief-supportable payoﬀs for disclosure
than other instructors. Standard reﬁnements then imply that the student should
put more weight on a deviation having come from this instructor. In particular, D1
(Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel, 1990; Ramey, 1996) requires that all weight
be put on type q = q∗, implying that the payoﬀ from disclosure is q∗ = 1/3. But
when disclosure is viewed so skeptically, the payoﬀ from disclosure is less than from
nondisclosure, 1/3 < 4/9, so nobody will deviate and the nondisclosure equilibrium
survives.10
10The nondisclosure equilibrium also survives the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987)
because any type is willing to deviate if it will be perceived as the best type by doing so, implying
that no type can be ruled out as the source of a deviation.
8Figure 1(a) shows this example where the privately known quality of the sender
is on the x-axis and the equilibrium expected quality of the sender, as derived more
formally in the next section, is on the y-axis. Among those who can disclose, for
any q∗ type q = q∗ receives the lowest payoﬀ from nondisclosure so she has the most
incentive to deviate. Therefore, as shown more formally in the next section, skep-
ticism regarding types who unexpectedly disclose is appropriate based on standard
belief reﬁnements. Figure 1(b) shows the disclosure equilibrium for q∗ = 1/3 in
which all types with good news disclose, and Figure 1(c) shows a countersignaling
equilibrium11 for q∗ = 1/3 in which only medium types within the range [1/3,0.885)
disclose. The countersignaling equilibrium arises because the highest types expect
to be partially separated from low types due to the receiver’s private information.
As seen in Figure 1(d), in this example the disclosure equilibrium oﬀers all types
q ≥ q∗ a higher payoﬀ, but in general the payoﬀs cannot be ranked.12
Given the multiplicity of equilibria that can arise with coarse messages and
private receiver information, confusion over whether one should disclose favorable
information, and uncertainty about who might have disclosed if disclosure is ob-
served, is clearly understandable. Therefore the question is not just identifying
conditions under which nondisclosure equilibria can exist, but ﬁnding reasonable
conditions under which nondisclosure equilibria can be ruled out. For instance, if
the standard q∗ for receiving a PhD is high enough then even if the student viewed
disclosure of a PhD with complete skepticism and thought the instructor was of
type q∗, the payoﬀ from disclosure would still be higher than from nondisclosure. In
the following section we develop a more general model with multiple levels of good
news to examine when nondisclosure of some form is an equilibrium and when full
disclosure (unraveling) is the unique equilibrium.
3 The model
In this sender-receiver game the sender knows her type q ∈ [0,1], the sender sends
a message v that is potentially informative about q, and the receiver has his own
signal x that is informative about q. The timing of the game is that the sender
ﬁrst learns her type q and then sends the message v. The receiver learns his private
information x either before or after hearing the sender’s message v. After learning
x and hearing v the receiver then takes an action a.
In contrast with most of the literature, we do not assume that each sender
type can send a unique veriﬁable message. Instead, we assume that there is a
11We use this terminology due to the equilibrium’s similarity to the countersignaling equilibria
identiﬁed by Feltovich et al. (2002) in signaling games.
12For instance if Pr[H | q] = q
3, then some types q ≥ q
∗ prefer the nondisclosure equilibrium to
the countersignaling equilibrium, and the highest types prefer the countersignaling equilibrium to
the disclosure equilibrium.
9ﬁnite set of veriﬁable messages that disclose a subinterval of the sender’s typespace,
e.g., a system of diplomas or of letter grades. In particular, we assume that the




N} and that the sender can send the veriﬁable
message v = vj if and only if q ∈ [q∗
j,q∗
j+1) for j = 1,2,...,N.13 In addition, there
is a “blank” message v0 that can be sent by any type, including types q ∈ [0,q∗
1) who
do not have a veriﬁable message.14 Therefore the message proﬁle is v(q) ∈ {v0,vj}
for q ∈ [q∗
j,q∗
j+1) and j = 0,1,...,N. We refer to sending v0 as “nondisclosure” and
to sending any other message v as “disclosure.”
The fact that the receiver has some private information x further distinguishes
the model from most of the literature. The eﬀect of such information is to exclude
the knife-edge case where diﬀerent senders with the same veriﬁable message have
exactly the same incentive to disclose. Therefore, we do not require this information
to be particularly informative. Instead, we only require that a higher q is associated
with a higher x and that x is never fully revealing about q. In particular, we assume
that x ∈ X ⊂ R where the joint distribution F(q,x) has full support, has no mass
points, and displays strict aﬃliation on [0,1] × X.
Regarding payoﬀs, to simplify the presentation we make the standard assumption
that the receiver maximizes his payoﬀ when the action a equals his estimate of the
sender’s type and that the sender’s payoﬀ equals this estimate. That is, we assume
that the receiver’s payoﬀ function takes the quadratic loss form, uR = −(q − a)2
and the sender’s payoﬀ function takes the linear form uS = a.15 Note that in this
disclosure game v does not have a direct impact on either player’s payoﬀ. Its only
inﬂuence is via the receiver’s estimate of q and consequent action a.16
We consider only pure strategy equilibria so a strategy is a mapping between
types and messages. Let the function µ(q | x,v) be a conditional cumulative dis-
tribution function representing receiver beliefs about the sender’s type given the
message v and private information x. Our equilibrium concept is that of a pure-
strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by a veriﬁable
13Following convention, we deﬁne q
∗
0 = 0 and q
∗
N+1 = 1 and ignore the open/closed set distinction





14For instance, a person has a certiﬁcate to prove that she passed an exam but nothing to prove
that she failed it. This assumption that the lowest types do not have a veriﬁable message simpliﬁes
the presentation.
15We only need for the sender’s expectation of the receiver’s action a to be increasing in the
sender’s quality q and for the sender to prefer a higher action. By Theorem 2 of Athey (2002),
aﬃliation of x and q implies that the former condition holds if u
R(q,a) satisﬁes the single-crossing
property. The model can also be generalized to allow for messages and actions by multiple players
following Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990).
16In this respect disclosure games are similar to cheap talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).
However, because of the veriﬁability restriction, they can also be thought of as an extreme form of
signaling games in which signaling for low types is inﬁnitely expensive and signaling for high types
is costless.
10message proﬁle v(q), a receiver action proﬁle a(x,v), and receiver beliefs µ(q | x,v)
where:
i) For all q, v(q) ∈ argmaxv′ E[uS(a(x,v′)) | q];
ii) For all x and v, a(x,v) = argmaxa′ Eµ[uR(q,a′) | x,v];
iii) µ(q | x,v) is updated from the sender’s strategy and F using Bayes’ rule when-
ever possible.
Condition i) requires that the sender’s message is a best response to the receiver’s
expected actions. Condition ii) requires that the receiver’s action is a best response
to the sender’s message. Condition iii) requires that for any information set that can
be reached on the equilibrium path, the receiver’s beliefs are consistent with Bayes’
rule and the equilibrium sender strategy. We are often interested in the simple case
where the receiver believes that a certain subset of types either disclose or do not
disclose. Therefore we deﬁne the expected quality of the sender given x and given
that the sender is believed to be in set Q ⊂ [0,1] as ¯ qQ(x) = E[q | x,q ∈ Q].
Note that aﬃliation of x and q implies that expected quality ¯ qQ(x) is increasing in
the receiver’s signal x, and that a higher type sender q expects that the receiver’s
signal x will be higher. Therefore, as seen in the example of Figure 1, E[¯ qQ(x)|q] is
increasing in q.
In this model it is always an equilibrium for all types who can disclose to disclose.
The proof (and all subsequent proofs) is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 A full disclosure equilibrium always exists.
In standard disclosure models without private receiver information and with a
veriﬁable message for each type, full disclosure is the unique equilibrium due to
“unraveling.” Since types with the best news will always reveal it, types with the
next best news will therefore also reveal it, and so on until all news has been revealed.
In the example of Section 2 with only binary news, it was shown that unraveling
in our model can fail at the very ﬁrst step—even the types with the best available
news might not reveal it. We are interested in conditions under which the best types
will in fact reveal their news and, when there are multiple levels of news, how far
unraveling will continue.
To this end, for any 0 < q′ ≤ q′′ ≤ 1, deﬁne
q◦(q′,q′′) = sup
Q
{E[¯ qQ(x) | q = q′′] : [0,q′) ⊂ Q ⊂ [0,q′′)}. (1)
This is the maximum possible nondisclosure payoﬀ for sender q = q′′ over the set of
beliefs where the receiver believes senders with quality below q′ never disclose and
11senders with quality above q′′ always disclose.17 Since E[¯ qQ(x) | q] is increasing in
q by the aﬃliation of x and q, this is also the maximum such payoﬀ for any sender
q ≤ q′′. Note that q◦(q′,q′′) is continuous in q′ since F(q,x) has no mass points, is
nonincreasing in q′ since higher q′ implies a tighter restriction on Q, and is increasing
in q′′ since E[¯ qQ(x) | q] is increasing in q = q′′ and since higher q′′ implies a weaker
restriction on Q.
First consider the simplest case where N = 1. Since q◦(q∗
1,1) is the highest
possible payoﬀ to any type from nondisclosure, and since q∗
1 is the lowest possible
payoﬀ to any type from disclosure, disclosure is ensured if q∗
1 > q◦(q∗
1,1). Since
q◦( , ) is continuous and nonincreasing in its ﬁrst argument, a q such that q◦(q,1) =
q exists and is unique. Therefore, if we deﬁne ˜ q1 as this ﬁxed point, disclosure is
ensured in any equilibrium for q∗
1 > ˜ q1. For instance, from the example of Section 2,
computations show that ˜ q1 = 2/3.
More generally, for any N we want to capture this idea that there is some set of






j+1) = q if j = 1
q◦(q∗
1,q∗
j+1) if j > 1
(2)
where the upper bound for nondisclosing types in the deﬁnition of ˜ q1 is now q∗
j+1
rather than 1 and the same argument for existence and uniqueness still applies. For
j > 1 the deﬁnition of ˜ qj depends on a given q∗
1 because the presence of types q < q∗
1
who cannot disclose always aﬀects the incentives of higher types to disclose or not.
Using this deﬁnition, now consider unraveling. If q∗
N > ˜ qN then types with the
best news vN will disclose, which means that the attractiveness of nondisclosure
by types with news vN−1 decreases. So they will always disclose under the weaker
condition that q∗
N−1 > ˜ qN−1. If they then disclose then this same logic applies to
types with news vN−2, etc. Because the ˜ qj are nondecreasing in j, unraveling implies
that the standard for impressiveness becomes less strict as unraveling progresses
from the best news down. For instance, if a PhD is suﬃciently rare that it is
disclosed, then it becomes more likely that an MA is disclosed, in which case it is
also more likely that a BA is disclosed.
The following proposition uses these arguments to show when an equilibrium
must involve a certain degree of disclosure. Unlike the classic unraveling results,
this proposition does not imply that full unraveling or even any unraveling at all
is assured. Instead, it gives conditions under which diﬀerent levels of news are
suﬃciently favorable that they are always disclosed. In particular, a given level of
17We exclude cases where the receiver believes that the sender plays mixed strategies, but this is
of no consequence as any expected mixed-strategy payoﬀ can be attained through the appropriate
choice of Q.
12news will be disclosed if it is suﬃciently impressive conditional on higher levels of
news being disclosed because they too are suﬃciently impressive.
Proposition 2 News v ≥ vj is disclosed in any equilibrium if standards are suﬃ-
ciently high (i.e., q∗
k > ˜ qk for all k ≥ j).
This proposition shows that full disclosure is the unique equilibrium if the ver-
iﬁable news is suﬃciently favorable. The following result extends the unraveling
argument to show that full disclosure is the unique equilibrium if the veriﬁable in-
formation is suﬃciently ﬁne and accurately measures quality. When the veriﬁable
messages separate the diﬀerent types suﬃciently well, the highest types have an
incentive to disclose their (exceptionally) good news vN even if they are thought of
as being only of type q∗
N rather than from the range [q∗
N,1]. Given that the highest
types disclose vN, the next highest types have an incentive to disclose vN−1 even un-
der skeptical beliefs if q∗
N−1 is suﬃciently close to q∗
N, etc. If the diﬀerence between
standards is suﬃciently close for all the veriﬁable messages, i.e., the message space
is suﬃciently ﬁne, then the unraveling continues until all news is disclosed. This
result generalizes the usual unraveling result which relies on there being a veriﬁable
message for each type.18
Proposition 3 News v ≥ vj is disclosed in any equilibrium if the message space is




k} is suﬃciently small).
So far we have examined when full disclosure is the unique equilibrium or when
any equilibrium must involve disclosure by those with suﬃciently good news. Now
consider nondisclosure. We expect that nondisclosure arises when q∗
j is relatively
low so revealing good news is not so impressive. To check this intuition we consider
the simplest case of a monotone nondisclosure equilibrium in which it is always the
relatively bad news that is withheld. In particular, we are interested in suﬃcient
conditions on q∗
j such that an equilibrium exists in which vj and any worse news is
not disclosed. To see this, consider the minimum value of q such that the expected
payoﬀ under nondisclosure of news vj and lower is equal to q,
ˆ qj = min{q : E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] = q}, (3)
where the existence of ˆ qj follows from the fact that E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] is continuous in
q and has range [0,1].19 If the receiver skeptically believes that a sender who deviates
18For our example with a uniform prior if the diﬀerence between messages is no more than 1/3
then there is full disclosure. If the receiver has a suﬃciently favorable prior about sender quality
then, as shown in Proposition 5, the incentive to disclose is weakened and this maximum diﬀerence
to ensure disclosure can be arbitrarily small.
19Since E[q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] is strictly increasing in j, it follows from Theorem 1 of Milgrom and
Roberts (1994) that ˆ qj is strictly increasing in j.
13from nondisclosure is of the lowest type who could deviate, then the highest payoﬀ
from disclosure of news vj (or lower) is q∗
j. Therefore, nondisclosure is clearly an
equilibrium if q∗
j < ˆ qj. The following proposition conﬁrms this logic and shows that
skeptical beliefs are appropriate under standard reﬁnements.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium in which news v ≤ vj is not disclosed both exists
and survives the Intuitive Criterion and D1 if the standard for it is suﬃciently low
(i.e., q∗
j ≤ ˆ qj).
This result implies that a full nondisclosure equilibrium exists if q∗
N ≤ ˆ qN. In
the example of Section 2 where N = 1, ˆ q1 is just the point where the minimum
assured payoﬀ from disclosure equals the expected payoﬀ from nondisclosure. This
is the intersection of the nondisclosure payoﬀ line in Figure 1(a) with the 45◦ line,
or ˆ q1 = 1/2 for this case of the uniform distribution. As we show more formally in
Proposition 5, if the distribution of q is biased towards higher types then the nondis-
closure payoﬀ line is higher and ˆ q1 is higher, so if the receiver already believes the
sender is likely to be of high quality then nondisclosure can be an equilibrium even
if q∗
1 is quite high. Note also that Proposition 4 gives a suﬃcient condition for the
existence of a monotone nondisclosure equilibrium, but there may also be other more
complex equilibria involving nondisclosure such as countersignaling equilibria.20
Regarding the appropriateness of the skeptical beliefs used in Proposition 4, the
question is whether they are reasonable based on “forward induction” arguments
about which types have the strongest incentive to deviate.21 The Intuitive Criterion
states that the receiver should put zero probability on a type having deviated if it
would not beneﬁt from deviation under the most favorable possible beliefs about who
deviates. Clearly the Intuitive Criterion does not restrict any type from disclosing
since every type would be very happy to disclose if they would be thought of as the
highest type by doing so. So skeptical beliefs supporting a nondisclosure equilibrium
cannot be ruled out. Regarding the D1 condition, in our context it implies that if one
type beneﬁts from deviation for a smaller set of possible type estimates than another
type, zero weight should be put on the former type (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and
Sobel, 1990; Ramey, 1996). In a nondisclosure equilibrium higher types expect
to be evaluated more favorably than lower types because of the private receiver
information, so they have less incentive to deviate than lower types. Therefore, not
20If, as in the example, N = 1, q is distributed uniformly, and X is binary, a countersignaling
equilibrium exists in which types q ∈ [q
∗
1,q
′] disclose while types q ∈ (q






1 < ˆ q1. This is the same suﬃcient condition as for existence of a nondisclosure equilibrium.
Moving beyond this special case, suﬃcient conditions for such equilibria are diﬃcult to attain.
21Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that without private receiver information the incentive
to deviate from nondisclosure is the same for each type, so the receiver should maintain his original
priors concentrated on the range of types who can send the veriﬁable message, in which case
nondisclosure is never an equilibrium.
14only does D1 have no power to reﬁne away the nondisclosure equilibrium, it actually
reinforces it by dictating that out-of-equilibrium actions must be viewed skeptically.
Proposition 2 shows that if standards are set high enough then nondisclosure
cannot be an equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows that if standards are set low enough
then nondisclosure is always an equilibrium. The following proposition uses these
results to show how the distribution of sender types aﬀects the potential for nondis-
closure equilibria. In particular it shows that if there is any common knowledge
information that makes the distribution more favorable, then the conditions for
the uniqueness of disclosure equilibria become stricter and the conditions for the
existence of nondisclosure equilibria become less strict. It also shows that if the
information is suﬃciently favorable then the existence of nondisclosure equilibria
is assured, while if the information is suﬃciently unfavorable then any equilibrium
involves some disclosure. We will use this proposition in our empirical test in the
next section.
Proposition 5 Let y be a random variable that is common knowledge.
i) The critical points ˜ qj and ˆ qj are strictly increasing in y if y is strictly aﬃliated
with q.
ii) News v > vj is disclosed in any equilibrium if F(q∗
j | y) is suﬃciently large.
iii) An equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion and D1 exists in which news
v ≤ vj is not disclosed if F(q∗
j | y) is suﬃciently small.
Note that part ii) implies that full disclosure is the unique equilibrium if the
information y is so unfavorable about the sender that F(q∗
N | y) is suﬃciently large,
and part iii) implies that full nondisclosure is an equilibrium if the extra information
y is so favorable that F(q∗
1 | y) is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 5 can also be interpreted in terms of the accuracy of extra informa-
tion about sender type. As shown earlier in Proposition 3, for a given distribution
of sender types full disclosure is ensured if the message space is suﬃciently ﬁne.
However, if the distribution becomes suﬃciently concentrated then full disclosure is
no longer ensured. For instance, if the distribution of q conditional on y is highly
concentrated around some q′ then F(q∗
j | y) is close to zero for all q∗
j slightly less
than q′, so from part iii) nondisclosure of news v ≤ vj is an equilibrium. By part ii),
better news will be disclosed, but only because of its rarity. Therefore Proposition 5
supports the intuition that a sender will be less likely to boast if the receiver already
has a relatively accurate estimate of her quality.
One way to test the model is through observing how behavior changes when q∗
j
changes. For instance, in the restaurant example if grading standards change so that
an A becomes more common then that is equivalent to q∗
N decreasing. This makes it
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Figure 2: Impact of extra information y on ˜ q1 and ˆ q1.
less likely that q∗
N > ˜ qN so that disclosure is assured, and more likely that q∗
N ≤ ˆ qN
so that a nondisclosure equilibrium exists. Alternatively, Proposition 5 shows that,
even if standards do not change, ˜ qj and ˆ qj change based on any public information
that changes the receiver’s prior about q. For example, the public information might
be whether or not a faculty member works at an elite university. The more favorable
is this public information the higher are ˜ qj and ˆ qj, so the less likely it is that q∗
j > ˜ qj
and the more likely it is that q∗
j ≤ ˆ qj.
To see how public information produces testable implications of the model, let
N = 1 and assume there is an additional signal y ∈ {l,h} where Pr[y = h | q] = q
and y is independent of x conditional on q. If y = h (y = l) is observed by both the
sender and receiver, then the distribution of types conditional on this information
is weighted upwards (downwards), so for any non-degenerate Q, E[¯ qQ(x) | q,y =
h] > E[¯ qQ(x) | q] > E[¯ qQ(x) | q,y = l], thereby implying ˜ q1 and ˆ q1 are higher for
y = h and lower for y = l as implied by Proposition 5. Figure 2 shows ˜ q1 and ˆ q1
for the example from Section 2. The left panel shows the highest possible payoﬀ
to nondisclosure for any receiver beliefs about who discloses, and the right panel
shows the payoﬀ to nondisclosure when no types are expected to disclose. In each
case the middle line is for the base case without extra public information, the top
line is when y = h, and the bottom line is when y = l. The points where these
lines intersect the 45◦ line determine ˜ q1 and ˆ q1. When y = l the receiver starts
with such a low opinion of the sender that there is a good chance that q∗
1 > ˜ q1
so the sender will always disclose even relatively mediocre news, but when y = h
the receiver starts with a more favorable opinion and there is a good chance that
q∗
1 < ˆ q1 so that nondisclosure is an equilibrium. In particular, in this example ˜ q1
falls from 2/3 to 1/2 with bad news, and ˆ q1 rises from 2/3 to 3/4 with good news,
so for q∗
1 ∈ (1/2,3/4) bad news implies that disclosure is the unique equilibrium and
good news implies a nondisclosure equilibrium must exist. By Proposition 5 this
16range increase as the good (bad) news becomes more favorable (unfavorable).
Finally, consider the welfare implications of the model. Diﬀerent sender types
gain or lose from diﬀerent equilibria, but since senders are paid their expected quality
and disclosure is costless, the total (or expected) payoﬀ of senders is constant in any
equilibrium. On the other hand, the receiver (decision maker) always prefers more
information and his total expected payments are ﬁxed so his payoﬀ is always higher
the ﬁner the partition of the sender’s type space that is revealed. This suggests
that policies such as mandatory disclosure, making rating standards more diﬃcult
to achieve, or increasing the ﬁneness of rating standards (e.g., issuing percentage
grades rather than letter grades) can have welfare increasing eﬀects.22
4 Empirical test
We now examine a simple test of the model’s predictions following the example of
title usage discussed in the introduction. In particular, we are interested in when
full-time, tenure-track faculty use the title “Dr,” “PhD,” or “Professor” and when
they go by their names alone. This decision arises in many contexts including
curricula vitæ, business cards, oﬃce doors, web sites, email signatures, etc. We look
at two cases where a suﬃciently large sample is obtainable and where the choice
is likely to be under the control of the faculty—oﬃce voicemail greetings and class
syllabi.
To minimize the impact of diﬀerent traditions in diﬀerent disciplines we focus
on economics departments, and to minimize regional variation we look at all state
universities in California. In particular, based on faculty lists from department web-
sites in the summer of 2004, we consider full-time, tenure-track faculty (assistant,
associate, and full professors whom we refer to collectively as “faculty”) with PhDs
at all 26 universities in the University of California and California State University
systems with economics departments.23 Based on whether or not the economics
department has a doctoral program, we divide the sample into eight “doctoral uni-
versities” and 18 “non-doctoral universities.”
We start with a sample of 430 faculty with a primary position in one of the
economics departments, 226 at doctoral universities and 204 at non-doctoral uni-
versities. For voicemail greetings we called at odd hours and on holidays when the
faculty member was unlikely to be present. Excluding cases where voicemail was
not working, was automated without a personal greeting, or was recorded by staﬀ,
we obtained valid voicemail greetings data for 129 of the faculty in doctoral uni-
versities and 120 in non-doctoral universities. For course syllabi we followed links
22Note that a full disclosure equilibrium always reveals a ﬁner partition than a full nondisclosure
equilibrium, but as seen in the example of Figure 1, in some cases a countersignaling equilibrium
can reveal an even ﬁner partition.
23We exclude one department where the department chair was the only listed faculty member.
17available on faculty web pages and used the ﬁrst listed undergraduate syllabus.24
We obtained syllabi for 124 of the faculty at doctoral universities and 67 of the
faculty at non-doctoral universities. Note that the decision to record voicemail or
to post syllabi might not be random. Since we observe demographic data for all 430
faculty in the sample, including those for whom valid voicemail and syllabi data was
not obtainable, we can check whether selection based on individual characteristics
aﬀects the results.
Based on Proposition 5, the main prediction we test is that an individual will
be more likely to use titles when their status as a PhD-holding faculty member
represents more positive news relative to expectations. All of the economics faculty
in our sample hold PhDs, but they are not immediately distinguishable to students
and other observers from faculty without PhDs and from part-time instructors.
Since it is less common for doctoral universities to employ non-PhD25 and part-time
faculty,26 this implies that there should be more positive expectations regarding the
status of faculty at doctoral universities.27 In terms of Proposition 5, being at a
doctoral university is a favorable signal y that increases the likelihood that a faculty
member will engage in “false modesty” and not advertise good news.
Table 1 provides evidence that is consistent with this prediction. For voicemail
greetings, the use of a title is far less common at doctoral universities. Less than
4% of faculty use a title at doctoral universities while about 27% use a title at
non-doctoral universities. A similar pattern holds in course syllabi. About 52% of
faculty at doctoral universities use a title while about 77% do so at non-doctoral
universities.28 These diﬀerences in faculty behavior at doctoral and non-doctoral
universities are signiﬁcant at the 1% level according to a one-sided t-test using
individual-level data.29
24When a syllabus for a given class was in multiple formats, we chose the format most likely to
be handed out in class, e.g., the .pdf or .doc format over the .html format.
25For the 11 non-doctoral universities with available data, the average percent of full-time faculty
with a PhD or the highest degree in their ﬁeld was 80.1% in 2004. For part-time faculty the
comparable number was 24.5%. The doctoral universities do not collect this data individually, but
those that report a percentage use an estimate from the University of California system that 98%
of faculty have PhDs or the highest degree in their ﬁeld. Data are from the annual Common Data
Set reports for each university.
26For the 13 non-doctoral universities with available data, the percent of all faculty that were
full-time faculty was 55.6% in 2004. For the seven doctoral universities with available data, the
same ﬁgure was 80.0%. Data are from the annual Common Data Set reports for each university.
27Of course, doctoral universities are more likely to employ graduate student instructors. Pre-
sumably most such instructors are distinguishable by age from regular faculty.
28Note that faculty at doctoral universities have a strong tendency to substitute “Professor” for
“Dr” and “PhD.” Only one faculty member used “Dr” or “PhD” in a voicemail greeting and only
one used such a title in a syllabus. In contrast, at non-doctoral universities 10 faculty used such a
title in voicemail greetings and 29 faculty used such a title in syllabi.
29The diﬀerences are also highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001 and p < 0.0005, respectively) using the
one-sided non-parametric Fisher test. Individual-level data assumes that each faculty member’s
behavior is independent and therefore does not allow for “focal” department-speciﬁc equilibria.
Using department-level rather than individual-level data, diﬀerences in title usage remain signiﬁcant
in one-sided tests using the diﬀerence-in-means t-test (p < 0.0001 and p < 0.0005), the non-
18Table 1: Summary statistics
Doctoral Non-Doctoral t-stat. for
Universities Universities diﬀ. in mean
Voicemail title usage (%) 3.876 26.667 5.311∗∗∗
(19.377) (44.407)
Years since PhD 17.016 17.942 0.638
(11.763) (11.112)
Male (%) 78.295 73.333 0.913
(41.385) (44.407)
Number of faculty 129 120
Syllabus title usage (%) 52.419 77.612 3.501∗∗∗
(50.144) (41.999)
Years since PhD 17.242 15.985 0.693
(12.084) (11.738)
Male (%) 80.645 74.627 0.964
(39.668) (43.843)
Number of faculty 124 67
Standard deviations in parentheses.
∗∗∗ indicates that the mean diﬀers between Doctoral and Non-Doctoral Universities
at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
The diﬀerences in title usage at doctoral and non-doctoral universities could re-
ﬂect demographic diﬀerences in the composition of the faculty. However, as seen
from the summary statistics in Table 1, this is an unlikely explanation since the
demographics of the two groups are quite similar. Nevertheless, to check for this
possibility, Table 2 reports logit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if
a title is used and the right-hand side variables are the doctoral university dummy,
years since earning a PhD, and gender. The results conﬁrm that faculty at doctoral
universities are less likely to use titles even conditioning on demographic informa-
tion.30 In column one the coeﬃcient of the doctoral dummy is highly signiﬁcant and
of the predicted sign for both voicemail greetings and course syllabi. This diﬀerence
is also seen in columns two and three where we separately estimate logit regressions
for doctoral universities and non-doctoral universities. A one-sided t-test ﬁnds that
the constant term for non-doctoral universities is signiﬁcantly greater (at the 1%
level) than for doctoral universities for both voicemail and syllabi.
As indicated earlier, there may be sample selection issues with the data since
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p < 0.0005 and p < 0.05), and the non-parametric
robust rank-order (Feltovich, 2005) test (p < 0.0005 and p < 0.05).
30Regarding this information, note that women are signiﬁcantly more likely to use titles than
men. Since women are relatively underrepresented among economics faculty and therefore more
likely to be confused with graduate students, part-time faculty, and non-academic staﬀ, Proposition
5 predicts that they are more likely to use titles.
19Table 2: Logit results for title usage






Years since PhD 0.067∗∗∗ 0.038 0.077∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.042) (0.022)
Male −1.122∗∗ −1.305 −1.074∗∗
(0.462) (1.063) (0.512)
Constant −1.540∗∗∗ −2.993∗∗∗ −1.769∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.905) (0.527)
Number of faculty 249 129 120




Years since PhD −0.021 −0.022 −0.018
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025)
Male −0.798∗ −1.030∗ −0.274
(0.435) (0.531) (0.737)
Constant 2.238∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 1.760∗∗
(0.488) (0.502) (0.711)
Number of faculty 186 124 67
Pseudo-R2 0.078 0.067 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗,
∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
20the decision to record a voicemail greeting or post syllabi online might be correlated
with the use of a title. One way to check if the results are signiﬁcantly impacted
by non-response bias is to treat the absence of a usable voicemail or syllabus as a
third choice for each faculty member so that data on all 430 faculty in the sample
is used. We therefore run multinomial logit regressions where, in addition to the
binary choice of whether or not to use a title, each faculty member can also choose
not to record a voicemail greeting or not to post course syllabi online. The estimated
coeﬃcients change only slightly, and Hausman speciﬁcation tests conﬁrm that there
are no systematic diﬀerences. Therefore there is no evidence that non-response bias
aﬀects the results.
Considering alternative explanations for the behavior that we observe, the dif-
ferences in voicemail greetings may arise because the likely callers at doctoral and
non-doctoral universities are diﬀerent. For instance, a caller to a doctoral university
is probably more likely to be a PhD economist who expects that the answerer is
also a PhD economist. However, the model incorporates such cases where the sender
determines a disclosure decision in knowledge of the likely distribution of receivers.
If callers to a doctoral university have a higher expectation that the answerer is a
PhD economist this is equivalent to there being more favorable public information
about the sender as examined in Proposition 5. Note that the model can also be
interpreted as the caller inferring from the greeting what kind of calls the faculty
member normally receives. Although using the title “Dr” reveals some favorable
status information, it also suggests that the faculty member frequently receives calls
from people who are impressed by a PhD.
Another possible explanation for understatement in both voicemail greetings and
syllabi is that faculty at doctoral universities do not want to waste time using titles
given their small information content, i.e., the message is not costless as assumed
in the model. However, in many cases a simple title is as easy or easier to state
than other formulations. For instance, in voicemail greetings faculty often inform
the listener that “you have reached the oﬃce of X” in place of simply stating “this
is Professor X.” And in course syllabi faculty often substitute “Instructor” for “Pro-
fessor.” Moreover, failure to use a title is itself costly in terms of misunderstandings
by poorly informed students and others.31 If it were not for the negative inferences
that can arise from promoting one’s own status, it seems unlikely that so many
faculty would avoid titles.32
31For instance, use of “Assistant Professor” on a syllabus has been known to induce unhappy
students to demand to see the “real” professor.
32Consistent with the result that disclosure by a third party does not suﬀer from the same
problems as self-promotion, faculty seem happy to let others refer to them by titles. In the 23
instances of voicemail greetings recorded by staﬀ, either “Dr” or “Professor” was used 13 times,
and there was no diﬀerence between usage in doctoral and non-doctoral universities. Similarly,
faculty don’t seem to object to the use of titles on department pages, but usually avoid them on
their own home pages. Because of the diﬃculty of determining the authorship of home pages, we
215 Conclusion
A large body of research concludes that costless disclosure of good news should ben-
eﬁt the sender. In this paper we consider a standard disclosure game assuming that
good news does not fully reveal the sender’s quality and that the receiver also has
private information about sender quality. We show that the presence of any private
receiver information, no matter how weak, implies that equilibria with nondisclo-
sure by some or all types exist unless the good news is restricted to suﬃciently high
quality senders. From a policy perspective the model supports the setting of higher
and more ﬁnely distinguished standards in order to reduce the scope for nondis-
closure equilibria. It also provides support for mandatory or third-party disclosure
of information as a way to reduce the damage that “false modesty” can have on
communication.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In the full disclosure outcome the receiver believes the
sender to be of type q ∈ [0,q∗
1) when nondisclosure is observed and of type q ∈
[q∗
j,q∗
j+1) when message vj is observed. Therefore, since ¯ q[q∗
j,q∗
j+1)(x) > ¯ q[0,q∗
j)(x) for
all x, E[¯ q[q∗
j,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] > E[¯ q[0,q∗
j)(x) | q] for all q ∈ [q∗
j,q∗
j+1), so full disclosure is
an equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Starting with the highest types, if q∗
N > ˜ qN then types
q ∈ [q∗
N,1] strictly prefer to disclose vN by the deﬁnition of ˜ qN and the fact that
q∗
N+1 = 1. In this case if q∗
N−1 > ˜ qN−1 then types q ∈ [q∗
N−1,q∗
N) strictly prefer
to disclose vN−1 by the deﬁnition of ˜ qN−1. The unraveling continues until types
q ∈ [q∗
j,q∗
j+1) disclose vj for j > 1. For the case where j = 1, we know that
q∗
1 > ˜ q1 ≥ q◦(q∗
1,q∗
2) since q◦(q′,q′′) is nonincreasing in q′ so that types q ∈ [q∗
1,q∗
2)
strictly prefer to disclose v1. ￿




mass, ε > 0. Starting with the highest types, suppose 1−q∗
N < ε. By the deﬁnition
of ε and ˜ qN, this implies 1 − q∗
N < 1 − ˜ qN, or q∗
N > ˜ qN. By Proposition 2, news
vN is disclosed. Now suppose q∗
N − q∗




N − ˜ qN−1, or q∗
N−1 > ˜ qN−1. So by Proposition 2 news vN−1 is also disclosed.
Continuing this process for the diﬀerence q∗
N−1 − q∗
N−2, etc. down to the diﬀerence
q∗
j+1 − q∗
j, Proposition 2 implies news vj is disclosed as long as q∗
k+1 − q∗
k < ε for
k ≥ j. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the particular equilibrium in which news v ≤ vj
did not formally analyze this diﬀerence.
22is not disclosed while news v > vj is disclosed. First consider senders q ∈ [q∗
k,q∗
k+1)
for k ≤ j. Assume that following an unexpected disclosure of vk for k ≤ j, the
receiver skeptically believes that µ(q∗
k | x,vk) = 1. This yields the lowest possible
out of equilibrium payoﬀ of q∗
k. Since q∗
k ≤ ˆ qj, it follows by the deﬁnition of ˆ qj that
E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q = q∗
k] ≥ q∗
k. Since E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] is strictly increasing in q it then
follows that E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] ≥ q∗
k for all q ∈ [q∗
k,q∗
k+1). Therefore the payoﬀ from
nondisclosure is weakly greater than the payoﬀ from disclosure of vk.
Now consider senders q ∈ [q∗
k,q∗
k+1) for k > j. The expected equilibrium payoﬀ
from disclosure for these senders is bounded below by q∗
k ≥ q∗
j+1, while the expected
nondisclosure payoﬀ is strictly bounded above by q∗
j+1. Therefore the payoﬀ from
nondisclosure is strictly less than the payoﬀ from disclosure of vk and the proposed
equilibrium holds.
Regarding the Intuitive Criterion, the question is whether the skeptical beliefs
µ(q∗
k | x,vk) = 1 for k ≤ j are permissible. The least upper-bound on the out-
of-equilibrium payoﬀ to a sender of type q ∈ [q∗
k,q∗
k+1) is q∗
k+1. That is, for out-
of-equilibrium beliefs that put suﬃcient weight on the upper end of [q∗
k,q∗
k+1), the
sender’s payoﬀ can be made arbitrarily close to q∗




j+1)(x) | q] ≥ q∗
k+1}. If ¯ q = [q∗
k,q∗
k+1) then no type would ever deviate under
the most favorable beliefs so there is no restriction on beliefs. If, however, ¯ q  =
[q∗
k,q∗
k+1), then the Intuitive Criterion requires that out-of-equilibrium beliefs put
zero probability on the event that a sender of type q ∈ ¯ q deviated by disclosing vj.
Therefore, for the equilibrium to fail the Intuitive Criterion, it must be that q∗
k ∈ ¯ q
and ¯ q  = [q∗
k,q∗
k+1). However, since E[¯ q[0,q∗
k+1)(x) | q] is increasing and continuous in
q, if ¯ q is nonempty, it must be an interval of the form [¯ q,q∗
k+1) for some ¯ q > 0. Thus
the Intuitive Criterion places no restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Regarding D1, again the question is whether the skeptical beliefs µ(q∗
k | x,vk) = 1
for k ≤ j are permissible. Under this reﬁnement beliefs must put zero weight on any
type which is willing to deviate for a strictly smaller range of actions by the receiver
than another type when the actions must be a best response for some admissible
beliefs. In our context where the receiver’s only action is to estimate the sender’s
type, this means that beliefs must put zero weight on any type which is willing
to deviate for a strictly smaller set of possible type estimates given the message.
Since the estimate E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] for nondisclosure is strictly increasing in q
and since E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q = q∗
k] ≥ q∗
k by the condition q∗
k ≤ ˆ qj, the set of type
estimates in [q∗
k,q∗
k+1) that dominates this estimate is either empty or is the interval
[E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q],q∗
k+1). In the former case nondisclosure is an equilibrium for any
beliefs. In the latter case, this set is largest for type q = q∗
k since E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] is
increasing in q, so D1 implies skeptical beliefs where µ(q∗
k | x,vk) = 1 for k ≤ j. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) Regarding ˜ qj, strict aﬃliation implies that E[¯ qQ(x) |
23q,y] is strictly increasing in y for all non-singleton Q. Therefore supQ{E[¯ qQ(x) |
q,y] : [0,q′) ⊂ Q ⊂ [0,q′′)} is strictly increasing in y, so q◦(q′,q′′) is strictly increasing
in y, which proves the result for j > 1. For j = 1, since q◦(q,q′′)−q is continuous in q
and q◦(q′,q′′) ∈ [0,1] for all q and y, the conclusion follows directly from Theorem 1
of Milgrom and Roberts (1994). Similarly, regarding ˆ qj, E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q,y] − q
is continuous in q and strictly increasing in y and E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q,y] ∈ [0,1] for
all q and y. So again the conclusion follows directly from Theorem 1 of Milgrom
and Roberts (1994). (ii) The question is whether, if the mass of F is suﬃciently
concentrated below a given q∗
j, it is assured that ˜ qj < q∗
j. If F(q∗
j | y) is suﬃciently
close to 1, then q◦(q∗
1,q∗
j+1) < q∗
j since there is full support, since q∗
1 > 0, and since
nearly all of the mass is below q∗
j. Thus ˜ qj < q∗
j for j > 1. Similarly for j = 1
the ﬁxed point q = q◦(q,q∗
2) must be less than q∗
1 so ˜ q1 < q∗
1. (iii) The question is
whether, if the mass of F is suﬃciently concentrated above a given q∗
j, it is assured
that ˆ qj > q∗
j. If F(q∗
j | y) is suﬃciently close to 0, E[¯ q[0,q∗
j+1)(x) | q] > q∗
j for all q
since there is full support and nearly all of the mass is above q∗
j. Thus ˆ qj > q∗
j. ￿
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